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Abstract: Apart from the human suffering it causes, growth volatility is a major factor that retards growth.
Recently several studies provided empirical evidence that democratic political institutions generate less
volatile growth. In the economics literature fluctuations in major macroeconomic processes, like aggregate
investment, are considered fundamental factors influencing growth volatility. However, the studies on
democracy and growth volatility do not provide any link between democracy and investment volatility.
Here, instead of democracy, we consider another institutional variable in explaining growth volatility: we
focus on the specific channel that links individualistic societies and low growth volatility. In our theoretical
model, it turns out that in a collectivistic society agents choose to invest together or choose not to invest
together. In an individualistic society, on the other hand, there are also some parameter values at which the
agents with more wealth choose to invest while the agents with less wealth do not find it worth investing.
Hence, investment volatility and consequently growth volatility are lower in an individualistic society than in
a collectivistic society. This is because in an individualistic society, agents are able to reap the entire
benefits of their individual investments themselves and make their investment decisions regardless of the
other agent’s investment decision. Whereas in a collectivistic society, individuals are not able to reap the
entire benefits of their individual investments themselves and cannot make their investment decisions
regardless of the other agent’s investment decision. We test the theoretical model’s prediction by
constructing a two-equation system of investment and income growth volatility, allowing various measures
of individualism to influence growth volatility both directly and indirectly. Using standard controls, we
importantly control for the development of democratic institutions. Based on a battery of sensitivity tests, we
find individualism significantly directly and indirectly influences growth volatility negatively. We also find
that, unlike individualism, democracy’s influence on investment depends on the measure of democracy and
econometric specification used.
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I. Introduction
There are extreme differences in per capita incomes and large differences in growth rates across countries’.1 There are also
large differences in countries’ abilities to avoid major crises.2 Apart from the human suffering it causes, growth volatility is
a major factor that retards growth (see, most importantly, Ramey and Ramey, 1995, for strong empirical support). 3
Therefore, it is not sporadic growth but sustained growth which is most sought after by societies which try to avoid
episodes similar to the recent crises in Latin America and Asia.
Given that growth volatility retards growth and thus prosperity, the relevant question is ‘what reduces growth
volatility.’ Recently several studies provided empirical evidence that democratic political institutions generate
less volatile growth (Rodrik, 2000, Quinn and Woolley, 2001, Mobarak, 2005). Rodrik argues that democracies
exhibit higher levels of social cooperation in the face of exogenous shocks which allows them to navigate and alleviate the
potentially harmful effects of these shocks. Quinn and Woolley (2001) argue that because of the mechanism of democratic
competition as well as the preferences of voters, democracies select away from high volatility.
The bulk of the economics literature, however, provides theoretical explanation and empirical evidence that the
fluctuations of major macroeconomics processes are fundamental sources of aggregate growth volatility. The popularly
held Keynesian view traditionally maintains that shocks that are specific to aggregate investment, and to government
deficit-spending, lead to rapid changes in growth and therefore to growth volatility. Monetarists, on the other hand, argue
that shocks to the money supply can augment or hamper aggregate investment, thereby adding to the volatility of
investment and therefore income and consumption growth volatility. Real business cycle theory, however, has been used
to argue that fluctuations in productivity contribute to major aggregate swings and therefore to investment and growth

1

The per capita incomes of countries range from slightly more than $100 to about $35,000. While some countries in
crisis experience decreases in their per capita income as much as -10 or more some countries with booms experience
increases in their per capita income almost 10 percent. Typically neither growth rate is sustained over time. However,
even one percent difference in long-term growth can cause large differences in per capita income: Controlling for the
population growth, for instance, a country that grows 1 percent per year will double its per capita income in 72 years
while a country that grows 2 per cent per year will double its income in 36 years.
2
Growth volatility is a major source of uncertainty for a society. North (1993) states that the pervasive human attempt
to reduce such uncertainty is the key to the understanding the way belief systems and institutions evolve.
3
Argentina’s jobless rate, for instance, went over 20 percent in the most recent crisis; in addition, the crisis pushed half
of the country’s 36 million population under the poverty line. A World Bank document states that “over the
long-term, declining health and malnutrition will affect worker productivity, reducing future growth, and
delaying the recovery” (World Bank, 2005).
1

volatility.
Thus, and not surprisingly, the determinants and sources of aggregate macroeconomic fluctuations are of
fundamental interest, and in ongoing research have been argued to include, in general, the level of aggregate economic,
financial, demographic and political development, and in particular, the level per capita income. For example, the annual
volatility of aggregate savings and investment has been strenuously argued to be a fundamental precursor to growth
volatility, and the primary factors that explain investment volatility - and consequently growth volatility - are human
capital, the extent of financial markets, capital market imperfections (including unequal access to such markets) and trade
openness.
Levine (1997, 1998), King and Levine (1993a, 1993b), and Denizer, Iyigun, and Owen (2002) demonstrate
that economies with greater financial development (banking, credit, liquidity, regulation) generate less macroeconomic
volatility. Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000) provide empirical evidence that the extent of the financial markets can reduce
volatility while employment fluctuations can increase it. Razin, Sadka and Coury (2002) use a theoretical analysis to argue
that trade openness increases investment volatility.

Easterly and Kraay (2000) provide empirical evidence that trade

openness can cause volatility especially for small countries. Aghion, Bachetta, and Banerjee (2000) demonstrate that
volatility is more likely for open economies and intermediate levels of financial development. Aghion, Banerjee and
Piketty (1999) consider a theoretical model in which capital market imperfections and unequal access to investment
opportunities are responsible for generating endogenous fluctuations in aggregate income, investment and interest rates.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) highlight the role of per capita income in reducing volatility.
Apart from Rodrik (2000), Quinn and Woolley (2001), and Mobarak (2005), other papers study the effects of
political and other institutional factors on growth volatility. Henisz (2000) presents evidence that the number of politicians
with veto power over policy changes (i.e. suggestive of a greater degree of democracy) is negatively associated with policy
shifts that influence investment. Nooruddin (2003) argues that political constraints on politicians are negatively associated
with growth volatility. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Taicharoen (2003) study the effects of a set of other institutional
variables on growth volatility as well as those of distortionary macro economic policies.
In the political-economy literature, democracy has been frequently identified as the most prominent political
institutional factor considered in explaining growth volatility. As will be reported in detail below, we find substantive
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empirical evidence supporting the finding that democracy negatively influences growth volatility. The above mentioned
papers that provide link between democracy and growth volatility, however, do not provide a link between democracy and
investment volatility, the latter a fundamental source of fluctuations in aggregate growth.
Here, we consider a “slower-moving” institutional variable than democracy4 that reduces growth volatility both
directly and - via reducing investment volatility - indirectly.

The institutional variable that we consider here,

individualism/collectivism, was also considered by Greif (1994), who examined contrasting individualistic and
collectivistic backgrounds of Genoese and Maghribi traders that led these two pre-modern societies in the late medieval
Mediterranean trade to evolve along distinct paths. By building on this tradition that highlights the fundamental role played
by the “slow-moving” institutional and cultural differences of societies on these societies’ different political and economic
outcomes, our paper focuses on the specific channel that links individualistic societies and their low growth volatility.
In terms of our empirical analysis, our starting point is Hofstede’s (1980a,b) analysis and data set on different
cultural dimensions. Hofstede conducted questionnaires in 1968 and 1972 among 117,000 IBM employees; the initial 40country sample was subsequently expanded to a total of 47 countries. It is still considered the most comprehensive
comparative study especially in terms of the number of respondents involved. Hofstede based his analysis on four
dimensions: ‘individualism’, ‘power distance’, ‘masculinity’, and ‘uncertainty avoidance’.5 In subsequent research, the
individualism/collectivism dimension far exceeded the other dimensions in popularity.

According to Hofstede,

“individualism stands for a society in which ... everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her
immediate family only,” and “collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into
strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning
loyalty.”

4

Roland (2004) distinguishes between slow-moving and fast-moving institutions: “What is often called ‘culture’,
including values, beliefs, and social norms, can be classified as a slow-moving institution. ... Political institutions can be
classified as a fast-moving institution."
5
“Power distance indicates the extent to which a society accepts the fact that power in institutions and organisations is
distributed unequally.” “Masculinity” points to the extent that the dominant values in society are assertiveness, the
acquisition of money and things, and not caring for others, the quality of life, or people. “Uncertainty Avoidance,
indicates the extent to which a society feels threatened by uncertain and ambiguous situations and tries to avoid these
situations by greater career stability, establishing more formal rules, not tolerating deviant ideas and behaviors,
believing in absolute truths and the attainment of expertise.”
3

Not surprisingly, Hofstede’s work has had its share of critics too.6 To show that our main empirical result
which relates individualism to growth volatility through investment volatility does not hinge upon the idiosyncrasy of the
IBM employees’ cultural values in the 1960s and 1970s, we will use the “in-group collectivism” index of the GLOBE
Project (see House et al., 2004), which also exhibits strong negative correlation with Hofstede’s individualism (-.71, p-val
= .001).7,8 The data on in-group collectivism were collected in 1994. Thus, arguably the other researchers’ more recent
indices’ strong (negative) correlations with individualism indicate the slow-moving nature of cultural institutions.9 Figure
1 demonstrates the comparatively strong match between Hosftede’s measure and those of GLOBE and Schwartz.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Note that, the U.S. (91), Australia (90), Great Britain (89), Canada (80), and Netherlands (80) constitute the top
five societies according to Hofstede’s individualism index; their index values are stated in the parentheses. Although
Switzerland has a higher per capita income than the U.S., the latter’s individualism index value exceeds that of the former
by more than 30%: see Figure 2. While Japan’s per capita income is 40% higher than that of Netherlands, the latter’s
individualism index value is almost 80% higher than that of the former. The comparison between Hong Kong and
6

Many of Hofstede’s critics suggested various refinements of his dimensions. Triandis (1995), for instance, argues that
several additional culture-specific attributes define different kinds of collectivism or individualism. For example,
although both the kibbutz and most East Asian cultures are collectivist, there are profound differences among the
specific kinds of collectivism of these cultures. That is, they constitute different species of collectivism. While
Schwartz (1994) provides finer graduations of cultural differences, his embeddedness/autonomy index is relatively
strongly negatively correlated (-.57, p-val = .008) with the individualism/collectivism index of Hofstede. Schwartz’s
index, however, spans a much smaller set of countries. Schwartz (2005) himself, however, contends that his
embeddedness/autonomy dimension is not comparable to Hofstede’s individualism.
7
Correlations are Pearson correlation coefficients; p-values are based on the Fisher correction, derived from a tdistribution.
8
The statements below constitute a very typical sample used by Hofstede to construct his individualism/collectivism
index values. They are “how important is it to you to ...” questions, of which answers have the range “of utmost
importance,” “very important,” “of moderate importance,” “of little importance,” “of very little or no importance.” A7:
Have an opportunity for high earnings. A8: Work with people who cooperate well with each other. A13: Have
considerable freedom to adapt your own approach to the job. A15: Have an opportunity for advancement to higherlevel jobs. C3: Have a job which allows you to make a real contribution to the success of your company. C4: Work in
a company which is regarded in your country as successful. C6: Work in a congenial and friendly atmosphere.
Similarly, the statement(s) “employees (individuals) should feel great loyalty to their organization (to their family)” to
generate the in-group collectivism index by the GLOBE project. They are “do you agree or disagree” questions, of
which answers have the “I strongly agree” to “I strongly disagree” spectrum. There are also “in this organization the
pay and bonus system should be designed to maximize ...” and “the economic system in the society should be designed
to maximize ...” statements with the ending spectrum ranging from “1.individual interests” to “7.collective interests.
9
In another way, “correlations between these measures and Hofstede’s indicate that although these new measures may
have some advantages, Hofstede’s data is more dependable than many had thought” (Peterson, 2005).
4

Australia is not less stark than the ones above, where the latter’s individualism index value is more than 3.5 times that of
Hong Kong. More interestingly, for each of the country pairs mentioned above, the growth volatility is less in the more
individualistic country.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Consider, for example, Hofstede’s measure of individualism (indiv: 1972), the standard deviation of U.S.
aggregate investment share10 (investment volatility: 1972-2000) and the standard deviation of U.S. aggregate GDP-percapita growth (growth volatility: 1972-2000). The bivariate plots of Figure 2 provide a simple story. Hofstede’s
individualism measure in 1972 is moderately negatively correlated with investment volatility over the proceeding three
decades (-.40, p-val = .008)11; investment volatility is more pronouncedly positively correlated with growth volatility (.62,
p-val = .000); and individualism itself is relatively strongly negatively correlated with growth volatility (-.55, p-val = .000).
In our theoretical model, we consider two agents (i.e., individuals, households, or firms) with different asset
(wealth) levels. These agents’ payoffs are determined within the cooperative bargaining framework of Nash (1950).
Agents can enhance their assets by investing in them at a cost. This cost and thus the rate of return to their investments can
fluctuate. We consider two types of societies. In the first type of society, individualistic agents adopt the Nash solution
(Nash, 1950, 1953) which yields a payoff ratio identical to the asset ratio of the agents such that the payoff of an agent will
increase when his assets increase, but will not change when the other agent’s assets increase. In the second type of society,
collectivistic agents adopt the Egalitarian solution which always yields the same payoffs independent of the asset ratio,
such that the payoff of an agent will increase whenever any of the agents’ assets increase.12
It turns out that in a collectivistic society either both agents choose to invest together or choose not to invest
together. In an individualistic society, on the other hand, although there are some parameter levels at which both agents
choose to invest together or choose not to invest together, there are also some parameter values at which the agent with
more wealth chooses to invest while the agent with less wealth does not find it worth investing. Hence, investment
volatility and consequently growth volatility are low in an individualistic society than in a collectivistic society. The
10

Consult Section IV and Appendix 1 for data sources and variable explanations.
By comparison, GLOBE’s in-group-collectivism has correlations of .25 (p-val = .09) and .42 (p-val = .005)
respectively with investment volatility and income growth volatility.
12
These solution concepts have also been advocated as social division rules; for instance, the Nash solution by
11

5

intuition is that in an individualistic society, agents are able to reap the entire benefits of their individual investments
themselves and make their investment decisions regardless of the other agent’s investment decision. Whereas in a
collectivistic society, individuals are not able to reap the entire benefits of their individual investments themselves and
cannot make their investment decisions regardless of the other agent’s investment decision.
A simple bivariate, triangular simultaneous equation analysis treating investment volatility and growth volatility
as endogenous detects a strong negative indirect influence from individualism to growth volatility through investment, as
predicted. We then introduce demographic, macroeconomic, financial and political controls that have broad support in the
empirical literature.

We find that both Hosfstede’s and the Globe Project’s measures of individualism/(in-

group)collectivism imply a more pronounced degree of individualism provides a significant indirect and direct impact on
growth volatility. This result remains robust to a battery of alternative model specifications based on political and financial
controls.
Moreover, our model allows a direct test of whether democracy negatively influences growth volatility. Here,
we control for multiple measures of macroeconomic fluctuations, of democracy and of individualism. As mentioned
before, we find substantive empirical evidence supporting the important finding that democracy negatively influences
growth volatility. However, unlike individualism, democracy’s influence on investment depends on the measure of
democracy and econometric specification used. This suggests that the link between democracy and growth volatility
deserves further investigation, and the final answer concerning the mechanism by which democracy influences growth and
growth volatility and the direct and indirect roles democracy plays has yet to be formed.

II. Institutions, Individualism/Collectivism and Political-Economic Outcomes
North (1994), in his Nobel speech, uses the term “institutions” to mean “shared behavioral regularities or shared routines
within a population” which “define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies.” North highlights the
key role played by culture in this context by stating that “it is culture that provides the key to path dependence.”13 While

Binmore (1994) and the Egalitarian solution by Rawls (1972).
13
Roland (2004) distinguishes between slow-moving and fast-moving institutions: “What is often called ‘culture’,
including values, beliefs, and social norms, can be classified as a slow-moving institution. ... Political institutions can be
classified as a fast-moving institution."
6

the Western Europe’s remarkable development “from relative backwardness in the 10th century to world economic
hegemony by the 18th century is a story of a gradually evolving belief system ... producing economic institutions and
political structure that produced modern economic growth,” many other societies got stuck in institutions “that did not
evolve into the impersonal exchange essential to capturing the productivity gains that came from the specialization and
division of labor that have produced the Wealth of Nations.... and even within Western Europe there were successes (the
Netherlands and England) and failures (Spain and Portugal) reflecting diverse external environmental experiences.”14
In line with the above insights is Greif’s (1994) examination of the Genoese and Maghribis, the two late
medieval Mediterranean traders. Trade was central to Genoa’s economy as well as to Maghribi traders. They both used
comparable naval technology and traded in similar goods. The two trader groups had contrasting cultural backgrounds,
however: “Collectivist cultural beliefs were a focal point among Maghribis and individualist cultural beliefs were a focal
point among the Genoese.” (Greif, 1994).
The Maghribis maintained transactional assurance by organizing agency relations15 within an informal
economic institution. Greif (1997) refers to this institution as a "coalition." The coalition members hired agents only from
within the coalition and paid their agents higher wages than the ones received by nonmembers.16 Based on the “gossip”
information network among its members, coalition never employed agents who had previously cheated against any
coalition members. Cheaters could be cheated by other coalition members with impunity. The coalition even held

14

Schwartz (1995) states that: “When values are used to characterize cultures, what is sought are the socially shared,
abstract ideas about what is good, right, and desirable in a society or other bounded cultural group (Williams, 1970).
These cultural values provide the bases for the shared norms that prescribe the behavior that is appropriate in various
situations. Cultural value priorities are inherent in the organization of societal institutions.” Schwartz (2003) continues:
“Cultural value emphases shape and justify individual and group beliefs, actions, and goals. Institutional arrangements
and policies, norms, and everyday practices express underlying cultural value emphases in societies. … Of course,
cultures are not fully coherent. In addition to a dominant culture, subgroups within societies espouse conflicting value
emphases. The dominant cultural orientation changes in response to shifting power relations among these subgroups.
… Yet, cultural value orientations do change gradually. Societal adaptation to epidemics, technological advances,
increasing wealth, contact with other cultures, and other exogenous factors leads to changes in cultural value
emphases.”
15
“Agents provided merchants with many trade-related services, including loading and unloading the ship, paying the
customs, bribes and transportation fees; storing the goods; transferring the goods to the market; and deciding when
how, and to whom to sell the goods and at what price and at which credit terms” (Greif, 1993).
16
Nagaishi (2004) provides evidence that, similar to the in-group trust of Maghribis, Japanese multinationals have a
significant tendency to send more directors (both the top of the board of directors and directors as a whole) from the
headquarters to their foreign affiliates than their American counterparts do.
7

relatives responsible for members' debts, which prevented older agents from cheating.17
The Genoese, on the other hand, evolved bilateral enforcement mechanisms which entailed the creation of
formal legal and political organizations for monitoring and enforcing agreements, an institutional framework that lent itself
to further evolution of increasingly complex trade. Greif (1994) states that: “During the twelfth century the Genoese
ceased to use the ancient custom of entering contracts by a handshake and developed an extensive court system for
registration and enforcement of contracts. Furthermore, the customary contract law that governed the relations between
Genoese traders was codified as permanent courts were established. In contrast, ... Maghribis entered an informal code of
conduct, and attempted to resolve disputes informally.” Consequently, the Genoese went on to evolve more productive
markets while the Maghribis eventually disappeared in the face of increasing competition.
The degree of individualism varies among species as well as among human societies. Some animals such as
tigers are solitary while others such as wolves are gregarious. Humans are clearly on the gregarious side of the spectrum
but different societies show differing degrees of gregariousness. While some hunting-gathering tribes tend to live in
nuclear families some other tribes prefer to live in clans. Hofstede’s definition of individualism/collectivism dimension has
strong links to family structure. However, there are substantial differences even in the origins of family structures of the
highly individualistic European and North American countries. Shorter (1975, p. 30), comparing old family statistics,
found that around as early as 1700 the nuclear family was already a norm in Britain and North American colonies (and to a
lesser degree in Netherlands) while the extended family dominated in the rest of Europe (there was no data available for
Australia and New Zealand). This is crucial in understanding the degree individualism/ collectivism of societies. Next, we

17

Even some contemporary societies exhibit some characteristics Maghribi type coalition arrangements. As McMillan
and Woodruff (1999) describe, in Vietnam, business people can easily cheat each other since courts are of no use to
them in resolving disputes. Entrepreneurs rely on reputation and gossip to select partners. They try to avoid disputes
by checking their customers' financial backgrounds and personalities with others who have done business with them.
The entrepreneur's incentive not to cheat a contract partner is not that the partners will sue but that they will stop dealing
altogether. Certain milder aspects of this, such as credit bureaus, are relevant even in highly individualistic societies
with very effective legal systems since legal conflict can be costly. Similar to Vietnamese businessmen swapping
information, a debt collection agency for fish wholesalers in Portland, Maine, recently began using the Internet to sell
wholesalers credit information about deadbeat buyers. Another example is a New York cable television company,
Paragon Cable, which rather than terminating the cable service, chooses to run C-Span's monotonous political hearings
on all of its 77 channels until the subscribers pay their bills. (See Stanford Graduate School of Business (2000) for the
last two examples.)

8

will elaborate on what gives rise to such distinctive family structures.
As Acemoglu et al (2004) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) explain, due to very low population density and
lack of easily exploitable resources, during colonial period in the North America, the British state had to grant access to
land and to accept the formation of representative democratic institutions. In Spanish America, colonial powers faced a
large indigenous population and rich resources to exploit. Consequently, in North America land ownership ranged
between 75 and 90 percent of the population, whereas in most Latin American countries it was as low as 2.5 percent of the
population. Thus, the crucial fact is that small, family farms were the norm in many colonies of the North American
mainland, where climate and soil conditions were conducive to growing grains and livestock which exhibited limited
economies of scale. These circumstances fostered relatively homogenous individualistic populations with relatively equal
distributions of human capital, wealth as well as political power (the latter giving rise to representative democratic
institutions). The Caribbean and Brazil enjoyed climate and soil conditions very conducive to growing cash crops that
were most efficiently produced on large slave plantations. These countries took an un-individualistic clientelist path and
generated very unequal distributions of human capital, wealth and political power.
Thus, initial climate and soil conditions, land policy and representative democratic institutions in the North
America led to the individualistic structure which allowed the U.S. and Canada to establish institutions to provide the
masses the chance to enhance their physical and human capital investment opportunities, while the non-individualistic
clientelist structures of the rest of Americas led to the opposite path.18 19
The role of education is crucial in this respect. Many New World societies had material means to establish

18

The roots of individualistic structure in North America are identified by Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) as initial
climate and soil conditions, land policy and representative democratic institutions. Recall Shorter’s finding that as early
as 1700 the nuclear family was already a norm in Britain and to a lesser degree in Netherlands too while the extended
family dominated in the rest of Europe. One may suspect that the relatively more urbanized way of living in those two
countries - compared to the rest of Europe - perhaps has something to do with that finding, since nuclear family
structure suits the mobility of urban life better. Another explanation is provided by Greif and Laitin (2004) who point
out that decline of political authority can make clans and extended families the prominent unit of social organization
since such corporate or consortial family form is more suited than the nuclear household to defend its wealth and status.
It could very well be the case that the relatively strong political authority in Britain and Netherlands also contributed to
the declining need for clans and extended families.
19
Clientelism (patronage) in a sense is a manifestation of collectivism and in-group collectivism. It entails loyalty for
kick-backs - and thereby creates solidarities - among individuals in networks of reciprocal processes; these networks
may be based on ethnic ties as well as on other factors such as occupational status, lineage, etc. Clientelism can thus
involve personalized reciprocal links between socially similar or discrete entities.
9

widespread network of primary schools. Virtually from the time of settlement, however, only the U.S. and Canada
invested in primary education that was more geared toward the children of the common people. Individualistic and nonindividualistic patterns of land ownership had implications on banking and capital formation too in North and Latin
America. In the former, “loans among farmers and planters in commercial agriculture were commonplace in the early
eighteenth century. … The outcome, circa 1910 could not have been more different: the United States had roughly 25,000
banks and a highly competitive market structure; Mexico has 42 banks, two of which controlled 60 percent of total
banking assets, and virtually none of which actually competed with another bank” (Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson,
2005).

III. Theoretical Model
We consider two agents where one agent has the normalized asset (wealth) level, 1, and the other one has the normalized
asset (wealth) level, a > 1. The assets could be human capital as well as physical capital. In short, we will refer to these
agents as L (agent with low wealth) and H (agent with high wealth). We will consider a Nash bargaining setup.20 In
particular, the disagreement point will be normalized to (0,0), and for simplicity we will use the segment [(1,0),(0,a)] as the
Pareto frontier in the first period. That is, each party’s ideal payoff will be equal to the level of their asset ownership (or
wealth).21
Agents can invest in their assets which will entail time and effort cost. In particular, given a level of ideal payoff
bi, each Agent i (i = L,H) can enhance their bi to kbi at a cost c > 0 where 2 > k > 1. At the initial period, agents carry out
their bargaining with their initial asset levels, 1 and a, and they will make their investment decisions individually
considering their second period potential payoffs. Each agent will decide whether or not such an initial-period investment
is worth taking.
In the individualistic society, the agents use the Nash bargaining solution. Given any ideal payoffs bL and bH, its
20

As Ken Binmore (1994, p. 21) rightfully contends, “much negotiation [and exchange] in real life” entail relationships
which “create a surplus that would otherwise be unavailable” to the parties (e.g., the potential buyer and the seller of a
house, employer-employee, landowner-tenant): “if you have a fancy house to sell that is worth $to you and $3m to me,
then ... a surplus of $1m is available for us to split.”
21
By definition, the ideal payoff of an agent is the maximum that agent could achieve if it captured the entire surplus.
With a given surplus, an agent with more assets (e.g., with more human and/or physical capital) can achieve a higher

10

outcome, N(bL,bH) is such NL(bL,bH) = bL/2 and NH(bL,bH) = bH/2. Thus, initially, with bL = 1 and bH = a, we have NL(1,a)
= ½ and NH(1,a) = a/2. Note that each Ni(bL,bH) depends on bi only, i = L,H. Observe that this is also the outcome when
neither agent chooses to invest (in which case the growth rate is zero).
In the collectivistic society, the agents use the Egalitarian bargaining solution. Given any ideal payoffs bL and
bH, its outcome, E(bL,bH) is such EL(bL,bH) = bL bH/(bL+bH) = EH(bL,bH).22 Thus, at the initial period, with bL = 1 and bH = a,
we have EL(1,a) = a/(1+a) = EH(1,a). Note that each Ei(bL,bH) depends on bi as well as on bj, i,j = L,H and i ≠ j. Observe
that this is also the outcome when neither agent chooses to invest.
Suppose both agents invest. Then we will have b1 = k and b2 = ka. Hence, we will have NL(k,ka) = k½ and
NH(k,ka) = ka/2 as well as EL(k,ka) = ka/(1+a) and EH(k,ka) = ka/(1+a). Thus, in this case, the growth rate is k-1 in either
society.
Next, with N, we will show that when H does not invest, neither will L and that when L does not invest, H
might invest. Let cHN denote the highest cost at which H would invest. Assume that any agent invests even when he is
indifferent between investing and not investing. As noted above, regardless of bL, we will have NH(bL,ka) = ka/2. Thus,
cHN will turn out to be ka/2 - a/2 = (k-1)a/2; that is cHN = NH(bL,ka) - NH(1,a). Likewise, regardless of bH, we will have
NL(k,bH) = k/2. Thus, cLN will turn out to be k/2 - ½ = (k-1)/2; that is cLN = NL(k,bH) - NL(1,a). Note that cHN > cLN.
Therefore, when the cost of investing, c, is greater than cHN (such that H will choose not to invest), then c will also be
greater than cLN (thus L will choose not to invest as well). Likewise, when the cost of investing, c, is less than cLN (such
that L will choose to invest), then c will also be less than cHN (thus H will choose to invest as well). But since cHN > cLN, at
any c such that cHN ≥ c > cLN, H will invest but L will not invest. Let a = 2 and k = 1.5. Then observe that NL(1,2) = .5,
NH(1,2) = 1, NL(1.5,3) = .75, and NH(1.5,3) = 1.5. Thus, cHN = .5 and cLN = .25.
Next, with E, we will show that if one agent does not invest, neither will the other one. Let cHE* denote the
highest cost at which H would invest if L also invests, and cLE* the highest cost at which L would invest if H also invests.

maximum than another agent with less assets.
22
The Egalitarian solution is a member of the general class of Proportional solutions (Kalai (1977), Roth (1979)). A
proportional solution yields a payoff ratio of P in (0,∞). In the case of the Egalitarian solution, P = 1. All proportional
solutions exhibit the same collectivistic feature as the Egalitarian solution. In a hierarchical collectivistic society P > 1
represents the patron-client relationships more appropriately. In this paper, however, we use P = 1 for its focal nature.
and, more importantly, for its simplicity
11

Thus, cHE* and cLE* will turn out to be ka/(1+a)-a/(1+a) = (k-1)a/(1+a); that is, cHE* = EH(k,ka)-EH(1,a) and cLE* = EL(k,ka)EL(1,a). Let cHE denote the highest cost at which H would invest even if L does not invest, and cLE the highest cost at
which L would invest even if H does not invest. Observe that EH(1,ka) = ka/(1+ka) and EL(k,a) = ka/(k+a). Thus, cHE will
turn out to be ka/(1+ka)-a/(1+a), and cLE will turn out to be ka/(k+a) - a/(1+a). Note that cHE < cHE* and cLE < cLE*. Thus,
when the cost of investing, c, is less than or equal to cHE* = cLE* both will invest and when c is greater than cHE* = cLE*
neither will invest. In other words, there is no c at which one of the agents invests and the other one does not invest. Again,
let a = 2 and k = 1.5. Then observe that EL(1,2) = .66, EH(1,2) = .66, EL(1.5,3) = 1, and EH(1.52,3) = 1. Thus, cHE* = cLE* =
.33.
Let c is uniformly distributed over any spectrum that contains [0,ka].23 Thus, there could be very high levels of
c, at which no agent would be able to invest either with N or with E. At some low levels of c, however, both agents will be
able to invest regardless N or E. As we will see, there will be a mid range of c in which the high type will be able to invest
with N but no agent will be able to invest with E.
With both bargaining solution outcomes, when both agents invest, the growth rate is k-1, and when no agent invests,
the growth rate is zero. Thus, the division rule that has a larger range of only one type investing will have less growth
volatility. For E, the range in which only one type invests is cHE* - cLE* = 0, and for N, that range is cHN - cLN = (k-1)(a-1)/2.
Thus, with E there is no chance for c to be at a level where one agent invests and the other one does not invest, but since
with N there is some chance for c to be at a level where one agent invests and the other one does not invest, the growth
volatility is less with N than with E.

Theorem 1: Investment volatility and consequently growth volatility is less with N than with E.

The intuition is that with E there will either be very high or very low investment and growth but with N there can be
very high, very low or at some medium levels of investment too. This is because with N agents are able to reap the entire
benefits of their individual investments themselves and make their investment decisions regardless of the other agent’s

23

Since no agent can receive a payoff of ka under any circumstance with N or E, c will be less than ka.
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investment decision. Whereas with E, individuals are not able to reap the entire benefits of their individual investments
themselves and cannot make their investment decisions regardless of the other agent’s investment decision.

IV. Empirical Analysis
The fundamental empirical prediction of our formal model is that individualism reduces investment volatility which in turn
reduces growth volatility. Thus, our empirical analysis considers the impact individualism has on growth volatility,
indirectly through its impact on annual investment volatility, in a triangular simultaneous system of equations.
In the economics literature, key links to stable investment and growth are popularly argued to be investment
level, per capita income, the extent of financial development, the level and volatility of government spending, private sector
finance, including access to credit supplied from banks, the amount of credit supplied to the private sector (as well as the
regulation of such a markets), the development of industry and services, human capital, access to education and training,
and health care, the population growth rate, and so on.

Recently, democracy, political stability, participation, and

competitiveness have been linked to a reduction growth volatility that retards growth. More discussion on these variables
will be provided whenever necessary.
IV.A. Data Sources
We consider five major categories of control variables, based on the above brief discussion: macroeconomic,
financial/credit, demographic, political, and cultural. We discuss below, in order, the set of control variables employed in
this study. The most prominent issue to bear in mind is the constraint on sample size. We base our fundamental measure
of individualism on Hofstede’s (1982) research, which is based on 47 countries fixed at the year 1972. Thus, a panel of a
reasonably large country list over multiple periods is not an option. We focus by necessity on Hofstede’s country list (see
Table 1 in Appendix 1), and consider variables based on initial values in 1973, or means and standard deviations over the
period 1973-2000.
We use the Globe Project’s in-group-collectivism as an alternative measure of individualism in order to provide a
robustness of check against use of Hofstede’s data: see Section IV.C. Because Hofstede’s and Globe Project’s country lists
are not identical, we defer to the 38 countries common to the two studies: this way, our robustness check will not be subject
to sample selection bias associated with the different criteria by which the countries were selected. After missing
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observations are removed, the sample size is 36 countries.24 Within the shared sub-set of countries, the two cultural
measures have a correlation -.695 (p-val < .01).
Because of the limited sample of countries available, and the broad literature defense of an extensive list of
reasonable control variables, we must balance logic with availability and space considerations. We therefore use a
reasonably inclusive list of control variables, and provide robustness regressions where multiple variables might logically
be included simultaneously (as regression complements), but must be included separately (as regression substitutes) due to
our challenge with degrees of freedom.25 See Table 2 for a complete list of variables, descriptions, and sources.
IV.A.1. Control Variables
Macroeconomic variables are collected from the World Bank Group and Penn World Tables. The primary variables
include the log of per capita GDP (initial, mean26); growth of per capita GDP (initial, mean, standard deviation); the
private investment share of GDP (initial, mean, standard deviation); the inflation rate derived from the GDP deflator
(mean); and the annual percent change of the local currency measured in U.S. dollars (mean). We also include a measure
of trade openness defined as imports plus exports as a share of GDP (mean).

In order to control for government

involvement in the local economy, we use government expenditure as a share of GDP (mean and standard deviation).
In order to control for the degree of financial development, we use domestic credit provided to by banking sector
24

We comment below on results of the fundamental tests when performed on Hofstede’s complete list of 47 countries.
When observations with missing variables are removed, the sample size is 45. In general, with respect to tests
considering the indirect impact individualism has income growth volatility, there is little difference between the
fundamental outcomes when Hofstede’s 45 (effective) country set, or the subset of 36 (effective) common to Hofstede
and Globe, is used. There are, however, some differences with respect to tests of how democracy indirectly influences
income growth volatility, which we discuss in Section IV.C.
25
Similarly, we omit lags and “changes” in macroeconomic and political control variables, as well as nonlinear terms
(e.g. Quinn and Woolley, 2001) and instruments for democracy (e.g. Mobarak, 2005): the degrees of freedom issue
severely binds our hands with respect to such extensions; there does not exist a consensus either in macroeconomic
theory or empirics on choice of nonlinear functional form (aside for the use of logs); and we opt to use widely accepted
direct measures of democracy and political participation. Indeed, in regressions not reporter here, we never find
quadratic terms in macroeconomic, political or cultural control variables to be significant. It should be pointed out,
moreover, that the sole index of democracy (cf. Freedom House: see Table 2, below) used in Quinn and Woolley
(2001) is fixed at the initial period 1972-1973 in that study, and typically only it, and not the change in democracy
measured over 1974-1989 (which is small for most countries, with a low cross-country dispersion), is significant. In
this paper, we use the mean of several measures of democracy and political participation, and find robustly significant
coefficients and fundamental test results: see below. In regressions not reported here, we never find the change in
popularly used measures of democracy to be significant.
26
The initial period is 1973; the mean and standard deviation are taken over the period 1973-2000.
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as percent of GDP (“bank”: mean), as well as domestic credit to the private sector as percent of GDP (“privy”: mean) source: the World Bank Group. Bank measures the relative importance of banks to the financial sector, and privy measures
the extent to which the financial sector interacts with the private sector. Other measures are discussed in King and Levine
(1993a,b), and include the ratio of M2 to GDP and the ratio of claims on the non-financial sector to total domestic credit.
Denizer et al (2002), in particular, find that bank is robustly negatively associated with growth volatility and investment
volatility.
Demographic variables used to control for human capital, health care and population dynamics include the log of
population size; the population growth rate; the mortality rate of children under the age of five; the fertility rate; and the
percent of the population with a secondary education (all variables in means).
Political control variables were obtained from the Gastil-Freedom House archive and the Polity IV Project.
Variables include Freedom House’s democracy,27 measured as an average of civil liberties and political rights (mean):
small values denote a greater degree of democracy; Polity IV’s openness of executive recruitment (mean), measuring the
degree to which political offices are open to members of a society; Polity IV’s competitiveness of political participation
(mean); and Polity IV’s measure of the difference between democracy and autocracy (mean: “pol”): large positive values
represent a greater degree of democracy, and large negative values denote a greater degree of autocracy.
IV.A.2. Collinearity
In order to reduce the redundancy of some explanatory variables and correct the potential hazards associated with
mulicollinearity,28 we only include mean income per capita (and not initial income), only mean and standard deviation of

27

Freedom House’s measure of democracy is more appropriately described as a measure of autocracy: large values are
associated with diminished degrees of democracy: see Table 2. We use the term “democracy” in keeping with the
Freedom House data archive, and an established convention in the literature.
28
There is an extensive degree to which many control variables in our sample are correlated. Of particular note is the
extraordinary degree to which the initial values of investment, income and income growth are correlated with the mean
values. Income per capita in 1973 and the mean income over 1973-2000 have a correlation of .96; initial and mean
investment have a correlation of .81; initial and mean government expenditure as share of GDP have a correlation of .86.
Similarly, individualism is highly related to many control variables employed in our models: individualism and mean
democracy (-.73), and mean fertility (-.63), and mean population growth rate (-.71), and initial income (.69), and mean
income (.66). Initial and mean income in particular are essentially controlling for the same macroeconomic information.
Moreover, credit supplied by banks and credit supplied to the private sector have a correlation of .94; and Freedom
House’s measure of democracy and Polity IV’s measure of the democracy-autocracy spread are strongly negatively
related (-.93).
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income growth (and not initial income growth), and only mean and standard deviation of investment (and not initial).
Because of the strong positive correlation between credit supplied by banks and credit supplied to the private sector, we use
only one credit variable at a time. Similarly, due to the strong correlation between alternative controls for extent of
democracy we include only one in any model specification. In regressions not reported in this paper, we find little
difference between use of initial or mean values.
IV.B. Econometric Specifications
We treat investment volatility (inv_v) and growth volatility (y_g_v) as triangularly endogenous, where investment volatility
is not a function of growth volatility, and individualism only enters the investment equation. This is the simplest
specification available that directly represents the theoretical model, allowing for the indirect causal path indiv → inv_v →
y_g_v, without feedback from growth volatility to investment volatility.29 Model 1 omits all controls variables and is
treated as a simple benchmark model, modeling only the indirect correlative channel from individualism to investment
volatility to income growth volatility. Model 2 allows controls for both investment and income, allows individualism to
affect growth volatility both indirectly through investment volatility and directly in the growth volatility equation, and
strongly ties our theoretical premise to the full macroeconomics and political-economics literatures.
IV.B.1. Framework, Estimation Methodology
The general econometric framework is

(1.1)

inv _ v i = α 1 + α 2 indiv i + α 3 ' X 1i + u1i

(1.2)

y _ g _ v i = β 1 + β 2 inv _ v i + β 3 indiv i + β 4 ' X 2i + u 2i

(2)

u j ,i ~ N (0,σ 2j ,i ),

j = 1,2 i = 1...n

corr (u1i , u 2i ) = ρ
where X1i and X2i denote the equation specific control variables. For Model 1, note that α3 = β3 = β4 = 0 such that
individualism only enters the investment equation, and all control variables are omitted.

29

In separate research, we consider models that treat income and investment volatility as simultaneously endogenous
and both as regressors, as well as models which consider the endogeniety of democracy (e.g. Mobarak, 2005). We
focus on the minimal, most concise requirements of our formal model in the present paper in order not to introduce
extraneous structure not predicated by our theoretical structure.
16

We allow for the country-specific errors terms uji to be heteroscedastic for each equation, and the equationspecific errors to be correlated across equations. Shocks to investment volatility will be spread to income growth volatility
through (1.2). However, and more importantly, it is certainly the case that shocks to growth volatility will be related to, and
incorporated into, shocks to investment volatility. Thus, it is important to allow the equation-specific errors terms to be
correlated. This implies we expect that investment volatility will be correlated with the income growth volatility error
term. Also, evidence not reported here shows highly significant patterns of heteroscedasticity in the unobservable country
characteristics.30
In order to control for both cross-equation error correlation and therefore the non-orthogonality between
investment volatility and the growth volatility error, and country-specific heterogeneity, we use heteroscedasticitycorrected Three-Stage Least Squares.31 In all cases tests (not reported here) of the hypothesis that the equation specific
errors are uncorrelated, after controlling for the included regressors, are strongly rejected in favor of cross-equation
correlation. Moreover, and not surprisingly, the equation specific shocks are significantly positively correlated supporting
our intuition that they have common components due to shared macroeconomic processes.
Finally, for each model we initially employ Hofstede’s measure of individualism. For Model 2, as a bench-mark
we employ Polity IV’s measure of the spread between democracy and autocracy (pol), openness of executive recruitment
(openexr) and competitiveness of political participation (comppar); and for financial development controls we use credit
supplied by banks (bank). For robustness checks, we use Globe’s in-group-collectivism (ingrcol), Freedom House’s
measure of democracy, and credit supplied to the private sector (privy): see Section IV.C.
IV.B.2. Test Logic
30

Individualism, mean investment, mean income, mean government spending, mean inflation, mean high school
graduation rate and mean fertility rate are all significantly negatively associated with the dispersion of investment
volatility and income growth volatility; similarly, government spending volatility, mean population growth, and credit
provided by banks all positively add to country-wide dispersion of investment and income growth volatility. Complete
estimation and test results are available upon request.
31
Essentially the method is an efficient form of Seemingly-Unrelated-Regression (SUR) with IV for the right-handside endogenous variable: for the growth volatility equation, we instrument investment volatility by passing it through a
linear filter involving all non-endogenous regressors (which is all remaining control variables). See, e.g., Schmidt
(1977) and Bartels and Feiberg (1992). Although in every model and specification considered in this paper do we find
highly significant evidence that the macroeconomic volatility errors are positively correlated, regressions using
predicted values for the right-hand-side investment volatility (SUR+IV) or the original values (SUR) produces
essentially identical results.
17

The fundamental test that individualism does not influence income growth volatility through investment volatility depends
on whether we are testing for direct, indirect or net influence, and whether we use Model 1 or 2. For Model 1, we test

α2×β2 = 0 against α2×β2 < 0. Evidence in support of α2×β2 < 0 means evidence that individualism negatively influences
growth volatility indirectly through investment volatility. For Model 2 there are two channels through which individualism
may influence growth volatility giving indirect (α2×β2), direct (β3) and the net indirect-direct (α2×β2 + β3) effects.
Evidence in favor of both α2×β2 < 0 and α2×β2 + β3 < 0 provides support of our main theorem that individualism
negatively influences growth volatility, after controlling for investment volatility, and controlling for the multifarious
processes that simultaneously influence income and investment dynamics.
IV.B.3. Estimation Results
In the first specification, Model 1, we omit all exogenous controls and focus entirely on the correlative relationships
between investment volatility and income growth volatility, through individualism.32 We obtain

(3)

inv _ v i = .434
(9.28)
y _ g _ v i = .275
(31.1)

− .219 × indiv i
(3.55)
+ .631 × inv _ v i
(5.53)

where parenthetical values contain t-statistics. Consult column 1 of Table 3. A joint test that individualism does not
impact investment and investment does not impact income is highly rejected.33 Similarly, a one-sided test that
individualism does not influence growth volatility through investment volatility is rejected at the 1%-level in favor of a
negative indirect influence.34
As alluded to above, a substantial literature suggests that growth volatility influenced by volatility of investment
share of GDP, access to credit, initial or per capita income, trade openness, government expenditure level and dynamics,

32

Recall that we use the subset of 36 countries common to Hofstede’s and Globe Project’s independent studies.
Test 1 (see Table 3) tests the hypothesis α2 = β2 = 0: individualism and investment volatility jointly are noninfluential.
34
Test 2 (see Table 3) tests the hypothesis α2×β2 = 0: individualism does not influence growth volatility through
investment volatility. The alternative is one-sided, α2×β2 < 0: individualism negatively influences growth volatility
through investment volatility. The p-value in this case is .003. When the complete Hofstede country set is used, the
one-sided test p-value is .001.
33
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human capital inflation, exchange rate movements, population size and growth, as well as political stability. Moreover, a
the literature suggests investment volatility is significantly influenced by initial or mean investment, initial or mean income,
government expenditure level and dynamics, inflation, exchange rate fluctuations, human capital, access to credit, and
political processes (Denizer et al, 2002; Acemoglu et al, 2003, etc.). Control variables used in Model 2 are selected based
on this literature, with the understood caveats of redundancy and limited sample size, cf. Section IV.A.1-IV.A.2.
Condensed results are reproduced below: consult column 2 of Table 3 for complete details. We obtain

(4)

inv _ v i = .953
(1.50)
y _ g _ v i = −1.21
(1.79)

− .349 × indiv i + .329 × pol i + ...
(3.04)

(3.81)

− .162 × indiv i

+ .265 × inv _ v i − .309 × pol i . + ..

(2.51)

(2.34)

(3.05)

Prominently, controlling for the multiple social, political and economic processes that are expected to influence both
investment and income growth volatility, individualism significantly negatively influences both investment and income
growth volatility: each coefficient on individualism is negative and significant at the 5%-level. Moreover, the predicted
values associated with Model 2 provide compelling evidence that the present model works quite well to explain the
volatility processes35: see Figure 3.
We strongly reject the fundamental hypothesis that individualism does not influence growth volatility in favor of
a combined indirect and direct negative effect. However, a simple inspection of the regression results reveals that this is
not due to a net negative impact per se (e.g. a small positive direct impact and a large negative indirect impact):
individualism significantly negatively influences growth volatility directly,36 indirectly37 and significantly negatively
influences growth volatility jointly indirectly and directly.38 The net impact can be deduced from the above equations:
35

Classical F-tests were performed on all models in this paper resulting in rejections of the null that all slopes are
jointly zero at below the 1%-level: because of the uniformity of this outcome we do not mention such measures of
goodness-of-fit again.

36

The individualism coefficient in the income growth equation is -.162, significant at at the 5%-level.
The Test 2 t-value is -2.78 and the p-value is .025. When Hofstede’s complete country set is used, the p-value is
.039 (not shown).
38
Test 3 (see Table 3) tests the hypothesis α2×β2 + ×β3 = 0 (i.e. indiv1×inv_v2 + indiv2 = 0): individualism does not
influence growth volatility directly (i.e. β3) and indirectly (i.e. α2×β2) through investment volatility. The alternative is
one-sided, α2×β2 + ×β3 < 0: individualism negatively influences growth volatility through net direct and indirect
channels. For the present test, the Test 3 t-value is -2.41 and the p-value is .037. When Hofstede’s complete country
37
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(5)

y _ g _ v i = −1.21 − .162 × indiv i − .309 × pol i
+ .265 × (.953 − .349 × indiv i + .329 × pol i ) + ...
= -.957 − (.162 + .265 × .349) × indiv i + (−.309 + .265 × .329) × pol i + ...
= -.957 − .254 × indiv i − .223 × pol i + ...
Other control variables generate coefficient signs roughly as expected. Credit supplied by banks negatively

influences growth volatility both directly (insignificant) and indirectly (significant at the 10%-level): this provides direct
support of evidence presented in Levine (1998), Easterly et al (2000) and Denizer et al (2005). This result remains robust
to every alternative specification discussed in Section IV.C. Fluctuations in the annual exchange rate and the secondary
education graduation rate negatively impact investment volatility, and positively impact growth volatility (both coefficients
are significant), results that are again robust to every alternative specification.
IV.B.4. Democracy and Income Growth Volatility
Our Model 2 serves a dual purpose of providing empirical support of our maintained thesis, and of providing a robustness
check against the findings of Quinn and Woolley (2001). Using a single equation model of growth volatility, control
variables similar to those used in the present paper, and omitting investment volatility and cultural measures as causal
effects on growth volatility, the authors find significant evidence that countries with more developed democracies are
associated with lower growth volatility.
Even a cursory inspection of the regression results from our Model 2 shows a far richer potential dynamic at
play when a multiple equation approach is employed: we control for the simultaneity of investment volatility and growth
volatility, the significant role investment volatility has on growth volatility, the role of cultural values as represented by
individualism, the dual role that the level of democracy plays on investment and income growth dynamics, for both the
heteroscedastic nature of investment and growth volatilities, and the correlatedness between the unobservable
characteristics (i.e. the errors/shocks) of our dual measures of macroeconomic volatility.
In this expanded context, we find that the democracy-autocracy spread (pol) significantly positively augments
investment volatility, while significantly negatively influencing growth volatility, cf. Table 3. Thus, the simple question of
whether democratic institutions are associated with macroeconomic volatility, and how, depends on which
set is used, the t-value is -2.28 with a p-value of .020.
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macroeconomic event is in question, and how they are allowed sequentially to relate (and which country set is used: see
Footnote 39). On the surface, because investment volatility significantly positively influences growth dynamic, we must
test for a net impact of democracy on growth volatility. We find that the democracy-autocracy spread has a significant net
negative influence on growth volatility channeled through investment volatility.39 This result is robust to the use of
alternative measures of individualism, credit and political control variable choice: see Section IV.C.3.
IV.C. Sensitivity Analysis
We now inspect the degree to which the above results are due to the specific financial, political and cultural variables
employed, and country set. Due to space considerations, and degrees-of-freedom constraints, using Model 2 as the
benchmark we consider only a few alternative specifications reported in Table 4, and comment on interesting results not
otherwise reported.
IV.C.1. Alternative Financial Development Variables
For the most part, use of either of financial development control, credit supplied by banks or credit supplied to the provide
sector, generates the same substantive outcome as the original Model 2. The coefficient magnitudes and signs are
essentially the same for either credit variable, and the fundamental test outcomes for individualism and democracy are
robust.40
IV.C.2. Alternative Democracy and Individualism Variables: Tests on “Individualism”
In Table 4 we present robustness checks by considering various combinations of political and individualism variables. We
provide a robustness check of Model 2 using the Globe Project’s in-group-collectivism; we estimate Model 2 using only
Polity IV’s measure of democracy as political control, removing openness of executive recruitment and competitive
participation; and we substitute Freedom House’s measure of democracy for Polity IV’s related measure, estimating

Test 4 (see Table 3) tests the hypothesis α12×β2 + β16 = 0 (i.e. dem1×inv_v2 + dem2 = 0): democracy does not
influence growth volatility directly (i.e. β16) and indirectly (i.e. α12×β2) through investment volatility. The alternative is
one-sided, α12×β2 + β16 < 0: democracy negatively influences income growth volatility through a net direct and direct
channels. In the present case, the Test 4 t-value is -4.20 with a p-value of .007. When Hofstede’s complete country
set is used, the democracy-autocracy spread coefficient is negative in both investment and income growth volatility
equations, but only significant in the growth volatility equation. In this case, the t-value is -4.84 the p-value is .0002.
40
The Test 3 (indiv) t-value is –2.67, and the p-value is .03; the Test 4 (dem-aut) t-value is –4.16, and the p-value is
.0071. We do not present regression results for the alternative credit measures for the sake of brevity: results are
available upon request.
39
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Model 2 with and without the openness of executive recruitment and competitive participation.
Across specifications we obtain evidence ranging from mild to strongly significant that individualism indirectly
(through investment volatility) and directly negatively influences growth volatility Hofstede’s individualism is used. Use
of either democracy measure, or either democracy measure in tandem with measures of openness and competitiveness of
the electoral processes, generates roughly similar results41.
Moreover, and most importantly, when we use Globe Project’s measure of in-group-collectivism (the opposite,
both conceptually and numerically, of Hofstede’s individualism), we again obtain significant evidence of our maintained
thesis: see columns 1 and 5 of Table 442. Thus, our main theoretical result regarding the indirect link from individualistic
behavior to macroeconomic growth volatility is robust to an alternative measure of individualism/ collectivism, and is
collectively robust to the use of alternative measures of credit and democracy.
IV.C.3. Alternative Democracy and Individualism Variables: Tests on “Democracy”
For each alternative specification, the coefficient estimates and the test concerning the net impact “democracy” has on
income growth volatility depends on the political/democracy variable(s) and the measure of individualism being
employed. The test results across political and individualism specifications are presented in the bottom row of Table 4.
If we use Quinn and Woolley’s (2001) favored Gastil-Freedom House measure democracy, along with
Hofstede’s individualism, Polity IV’s measures of political openness and competitiveness, and the country list common to
41

We reject in favor of individualism having a net negative impact on income growth volatility at the 13%-15%-level
when Hofstede’s individualism is used in tandem with either Freedom House’s democracy or Polity IV’s democracyautocracy spread alone (without political participation or competitiveness): see columns 2 and 4 of Table 4. When
Hofstede’s complete country list is used, we reject in favor of a net negative impact at the 5%-10%-level. We reject in
favor of a net negative impact at the 10% level if we use Globe’s in-group-collectivism and Freedom House’s
democracy: see column 5 of Table 4.
42
Recall that in-group-collectivism measures the propensity to which members of a society behave collectively.
Therefore, applying our theorem’s main prediction, we expect collectivism to promote investment volatility, which will
positively influence growth volatility: we predict a positive channel from collectivism to macroeconomic growth
volatility. The estimated coefficient in the investment volatility equation is positive and significant at the roughly the
5%-level. The estimated coefficient in the growth volatility equation is negative and significant at the 10% level
(column 1 of Table 4), or 1%-level (column 5 of Table 4). Jointly, the relative magnitudes imply a net positive link
from collectivism to income growth volatility, with the positive indirect effect through investment volatility trumping
the comparatively small negative direct effect. In column 1 of Table 4, the Test 3 (indiv) t-value is 1.74, with p-value of
.078, when Polity IV’s democracy-autocracy spread is used with political openness and competitiveness (column 1);
and in column 5 the Test 3 t-value is 1.55, with p-value of .098 when Freedom House’s democracy is used alone
(column 5). Thus, while evidence suggests a negative direct impact is possible, the net impact is significantly positive
due to the indirect channel through investment volatility, as predicted.
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Hofstede and Globe, we find significant evidence that smaller values of democracy (i.e. a more established extent of
democracy) leads to lower levels of investment volatility (i.e. the estimated coefficient is positive), whereas the direct effect
on income growth volatility is highly insignificant: see column 3 of Table 4. Indeed, we reject the claim that “democracy”
has a zero effect on income growth volatility in favor of an indirect negative effect.43 The result is even stronger if we use
Hofstede’s complete country list: in this case, the presence of democratic institutions significantly reduces volatility in both
investment and income growth (not shown), and we profoundly reject the claim that democracy does not influence income
growth volatility in favor of a negative role.44
In every case we find either significant evidence that “democracy” is associated with a net negative impact on
growth volatility: in every case save one,45 the measured impact is positive in one equation (investment or income) and
negative in the other equation (income or investment); and in every case the only significant coefficient occurs with the
expected sign.46
There are, however, notable differences in how Freedom House’s measure democracy and Polity IV’s measure
of the democracy-autocracy spread influence volatility. Using the country set common to Hofstede and Globe, Polity IV’s
measure significantly negatively impacts income growth volatility directly, and either does not play an indirect role, or
indirectly positively augments growth volatility through investment volatility: see column 2 of Table 3. Freedom House’s
democracy, the chosen measure of Quinn an Woolley (2001), by comparison, captures the obverse relationship in 2 out of
3 specifications (columns 3-4 in Table 4): more democracy leads to less investment volatility, more growth volatility
directly, and less income growth volatility indirectly through investment.47 Thus, our Model 2 suggests that the reason that

43

See column 3 of Table 4. The Test 4 t-value is 1.92 with a p-value of .063. The positive value implies Freedom
House’s democracy (which measures the extent of autocracy), has a positive indirect influence on income growth
volatility: this implies the extent of democracy has a negative indirect influence.
44
See column 3 of Table 4. In this case the coefficient on democracy is positive and significant at below the 1%-level
in both equations (not shown), and the Test 4 t-value is 5.87with a p-value of .00003.
45
The exception is in column 5 of Table 4, in which in-group-collectivism is used with Freedom House’s democracy,
and no other political controls. However, in this case the coefficients on democracy (measuring autocracy) are
significantly positive in both volatility equations, as expected.
46
For example, in column 3 we use Hofstede’s individualism, Freedom House’s democracy (which measures the
extent of autocracy), along with Polity IV’s measures of political openness and competitiveness: the coefficient in the
investment equation is positive and significant at the 1% level (more autocracy is associated with more volatility), and
the coefficient in the income growth volatility equation is negative and insignificant.
47
Note, however, that neither democracy coefficient in the respective growth volatility equations of columns 3 and 4 is
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democracy lowers the potential for growth volatility may involve a macroeconomic investment dynamic.
If we expand the sample set to include all of Hofstede’s countries, the fundamental test results remain intact.
Using Polity IV’s measure of democracy alone (without measures of political openness and competitiveness), democracy
has a significant negative impact on both macroeconomics volatility variables. If political openness and competitiveness
are included, democracy negatively influences both, but only growth volatility significantly. If Freedom House’s
“democracy” is used alone, we find democracy lowers both volatilities, but only investment volatility significantly. In
tandem with both controls for political competitiveness and openness, democracy strongly significantly negatively
influences both volatilities. Clearly, all of these results demand further investigation, a matter we leave for future
endeavors.

V. Concluding Remarks
Clearly a simple theoretical model like ours cannot capture the entire complexity of individualistic and collectivistic
societies in identifying all of the channels through which growth volatility can be influenced. Investment decision itself is a
complicated one which at times can involve complex social interactions. As Triandis (1995) argues, in collectivistic
cultures knowledge sharing is limited within the society at large (it takes places primarily among in-group members
as Greif (1994) described about the Maghribis).48 Furthermore, in these societies individuals tend to avoid deviations
from the others and thus will tend to mimic each other’s investment behavior. This reinforces co-movement of investment
behavior among individuals in these societies. In contrast, individuals in individualistic cultures tend to share knowledge
with relative ease even with the ones who are not necessarily members of their in-groups. Such an environment also
allows a broader tolerance for different opinions and individual deviations in investment behavior. This will curb comovement of investment behavior. We believe that this is a promising direction for future research.
Finally, it is interesting to point out that across all specifications treated in Tables 3-4 we find mean government
expenditure positively influencing both macroeconomic volatilities, and, with the exception of the original specification of

significant: it is significant in column 5 of Table 4 with the expected sign.
48
Also, see Peltokorpi (2004) on the limited knowledge sharing with others in the Japanese society.
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Model 2 in Table 3, the only significant coefficient occurs in the investment volatility equation. Thus, evidence suggests
higher levels of government spending, measured as a percent share of GDP, significantly positively induces a greater
dispersion of income growth. We suspect that that the reason behind that relationship is strong positive correlation
between collectivism and high government expenditures. However, the specific channel between the latter two variables
needs to be identified, which we leave for future research.
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Appendix 1: Tables
Country

Table 1: List of 47 Countries in Sample
Hofstede1
Globe2 Income Growth Vol. 3

Investment Vol. 4

Argentina
46
5.51
0.3593
0.2688
Australia
90
4.14
0.4720
0.1261
Austria
55
4.89
0.5042
0.1826
Belgium
75
.
0.4902
0.1859
Brazil
38
5.16
0.4260
0.2819
Canada
80
4.22
0.4688
0.1906
Chile
23
.
0.5750
0.3791
Costa Rica
15
5.26
0.3752
0.0929
Denmark
74
3.63
0.4710
0.1630
Ecuador
8
5.55
0.3400
0.1531
El Salvador
19
5.22
0.3242
0.1140
Finland
63
4.23
0.4903
0.1480
France
71
4.66
0.4739
0.1723
Germany
67
4.40
0.4959
0.1956
Greece
35
5.28
0.4211
0.1676
Guatemala
6
5.54
0.3567
0.1357
Hong Kong
25
5.33
0.7301
0.2232
India
48
5.81
0.5950
0.2349
Indonesia
14
5.50
0.7475
0.4183
Iran
41
.
0.2992
0.7002
Ireland
70
5.12
0.6471
0.1649
Israel
54
4.63
0.5224
0.1328
Italy
76
4.99
0.5226
0.1796
Jamaica
39
.
0.3626
0.2166
Japan
46
4.72
0.5470
0.2312
Malaysia
26
5.71
0.6552
0.1684
Mexico
30
5.47
0.4015
0.1107
Netherlands
80
5.62
0.4701
0.1691
New Zealand
79
3.79
0.4083
0.1466
Norway
69
3.58
0.5134
0.1202
Pakistan
14
.
0.5368
0.1825
Panama
11
.
0.4411
0.1091
Peru
16
.
0.2756
0.1554
Philippines
32
.
0.3804
0.1384
Portugal
27
6.14
0.5765
0.1624
Singapore
20
5.64
0.7527
0.1329
South Africa
65
5.66
0.3362
0.2648
South Korea
18
5.18
0.8306
0.1900
Spain
51
5.53
0.4869
0.2210
Sweden
71
3.46
0.4391
0.1689
Switzerland
68
4.04
0.4268
0.1762
Thailand
20
5.72
0.7216
0.0923
Turkey
37
5.79
0.5010
0.3151
UK
89
4.08
0.5073
0.1563
USA
91
4.22
0.4712
0.3162
Uruguay
36
.
0.5037
0.0523
Venezuela
12
5.41
0.3219
0.2630
Notes: 1. Hofstede’s (1982) individualism;
2. The Globe project’s in-group-collectivism;
3. The standard deviation of log-gdp per capita over the period 1973-2000;
4. The standard deviation of private investment share of gdp over 1973-2000.
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Table 2: Variables – Descriptive Statistics and Sources
Mean1
SD2
Name
Description
Macroeconomic Variables
inv_sh
Initial gross domestic investment share of GDP5
inv_sh_m
Mean investment share of GDP
inv_sh_v
Standard deviation investment share of GDP
y
Initial log of GDP per capita
y_m
Mean Log of GDP per capita
y_g
Initial growth of GDP per capita
y_g_m
Mean growth of GDP per capita
y_g_v
Standard deviation growth of GDP per capita
tra
Mean trade openness6
gov_s_m
Mean government expenditure share
gov_s_v
Standard deviation government expenditure share
infl
Mean inflation: GDP deflator
exch
Mean exchange rate annual percent change
Credit Variables
bank
Mean domestic credit provided by banking sector (% GDP)
privy
Mean domestic credit to private sector (% GDP)

Source3

Sign4

22.90
20.38
3.317
7.779
8.757
.1149
0.066
0.048
0.534
16.23
3.157
36.46
0.282

9.275
5.906
1.587
0.790
0.758
.0605
0.015
0.020
0.429
6.713
2.215
89.04
85.06

PWT
PWT
PWT
PWT
PWT
PWT
PWT
PWT
WB
WB
WB
WB
WB

+
+
-

75.30
59.89

42.39
37.17

WB
WB

-

15.47
9.807
0.014
40.02
2.874

3.024
1.418
0.009
37.83
1.249

WB
PWT
PWT
PWT
PWT

?
+
+
+

2.494
2.750
3.786
3.924

1.403
7.916
.490
1.113

FH
POL
POL
POL

-

45.53
4.969

25.61
0.736

HOF
GLO

+

+
+
?
?

Demographic Variables
sec
pop
pop_g
mort
fert

Mean percent of population with secondary education
Mean log population size
Mean population growth rate
Mean mortality rate of children under age of 5
Mean fertility rate

Political Variables
dem
pol
openexr
comppar

Mean democracy7
Democracy – Autocracy spread8
Mean openness of executive recruitment9
Mean competitiveness of participation10

Culture Variables
indiv
ingrcol

Individualism
In-group-collectivism

Notes: 1. The country mean over 1973-2000;
2. The country mean of the standard deviation over 1973-2000, except for individualism and in-group-collectivism which
were measured for the sole years of 1972 and 1994 respectively;
3. Sources are PWT = Penn World Table (pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php), WB = World Bank Group data
archive (www.worldbank.org/); FH = Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org), POL = Polity-IV Project data archive
(www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/); HOF = Hofstede (1982); GLO – Globe Project, House et al (2004);
4. The expected net impact on income growth volatility (y_g_v).
5. Initial values are taken at 1973 when available;, otherwise the year closest to 1973;
6. Trade openness = ratio of (inports + exports) to GDP;
7. dem = average of civil liberties and political rights a measured by the Gastil index at Freedom House: the range is 1…7,
where 1 denotes the highest rating and 7 denotes the lowest;
8. Pol is the difference between the Polity IV’s measures of Democracy (0…10) and Autocracy (0…10): the range is
–10…10, where –10 denotes most autocratic and 10 denotes most democratic.
9. Openness of executive recruitment ranges from 1…4;
10. Competitiveness of political participation ranges from 1…4.
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Table 3
Model 1
(base)

Constant
Individualism
Investment Volatility
Investment: mean
Income: mean
Income growth: mean
Gov. expenditure: mean
Gov. expend.: volatility
Inflation: mean
Exch. rate fluct.: mean
Credit by banks: mean
Secondary education.: mean
Pop. size: mean
Pop. growth rate: mean
Fertility rate: mean
Mortality rate: mean
Dem. – Autoc.: mean
Executive openness: mean
Competitive participation: mean
Test 1. indiv1 = inv_v2 = 02
Test 2. indiv1× inv_v2 = 0
Test 3. indiv1× inv_v2+indiv2 = 0
Test 3. indiv1× inv_v2+indiv2 = 0 (h)5
Test 4. dem1× inv_v2+dem2 = 0
Test 4. dem1× inv_v2+dem2 = 0 (h)
Obs.

Model 2
(base + controls + individualism in
growth volatility equation)
Investment
Income Growth
Investment
Income Growth
Volatility
Volatility
Volatility
Volatility
.434
.275
.953
-1.21
(9.28)1***
(13.1)***
(1.50)
(1.79)
-.219
-.349
-.162
(3.55)***
(3.04**
(2.51)**
.631
.265
(5.53)***
(2.34)*
1.57
(3.23)**
-.432
.843
(.473)
(1.37)
-.134
.105
(.753)
(.933)
.290
.927
(1.53)
(2.56)*
-.07
-.243
(1.87)*
(4.01)***
.010
-.037
(4.14)***
(2.56)**
-.052
.089
(2.10)*
(4.71)***
-.107
-.049
(1.85)*
(1.29)
-.688
.956
(2.12)**
(1.71)
1.03
(.687)
-.596
(2.13)*
1.14
(3.16)**
-.067
(.739)
.329
-.309
(3.81)***
(3.05)**
.360
.597
(.264)
(.691)
-1.651
1.23
(4.12)***
(2.56)**
42.133 (.000) 4
12.37 (.002)
-2.98 (.003)
-2.78 (.025)
-2.41 (.037)
-2.28 (.020)
-4.20 (.007))
-4.84 (.000)
36
36

Notes: 1. All regression results, and tests (unless otherwise noted) are based on the country set common to Hofstede and
Globe. Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2. Test 1 tests the two-sided hypothesis that individualism in the investment volatility equation and investment volatility
in the income growth volatility equation are jointly insignificant; Test 2 tests the one-sided hypothesis that individualism
negatively influences income growth volatility indirectly through investment volatility; Test 3 (4) tests the one-sided hypothesis
that individualism (democracy) negatively influences income growth volatility indirectly through investment volatility and directly
through the income growth volatility equation.
3. Test 1 is an F-test with 2-degrees of freedom; Tests 2 - 4 are nonlinear one-sided t-tests.
4. Parenthetical values are p-values based on F-distribution for Test 1, and the t-distribution for the one-sided Tests 2 – 4.
5. Tests denoted “h” are based on estimates using the entire country set of Hofstede.
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Table 4: Robustness Checks
Individualism, and
Individualism and
In-Group-Collectivism,
Dem-Autoc., Exec. Open.
Democracy, Exec. Open.
Dem-Autoc.
and Compet. Partic
and Compet. Partic.
Invest.
Income
Invest.
Income
Invest.
Income
Volatility
Growth
Volatility
Growth
Volatility
Growth
Volatility
Volatility
Volatility
Constant
.476
.205
0.796
.843
-1.869
.561
(.874)
(.215)
(1.20)
(.351)
(2.32)*
(.569)
Individualism
-0.323
-.112
-.111
-.214
(2.47)**
(.365)
(1.89)*
(1.83)*
In-Group-Collect.
.920
-.356
(2.61)**
(2.07)*
Investment Vol.
.391
.434
.267
(3.15)**
(2.22)*
(2.21)*
Investment: mean
2.49
1.890
1.920
(3.97)***
(4.49)***
(2.71)**
Income: mean
-.350
-.648
-.725
-.651
.871
-.805
(.443)
(.774)
(.88)
(.293)
(1.01)
(.859)
Income growth: mean
-.336
.116
-0.073
.066
-.153
.004
(1.36)
(.673)
(.48)
(.172)
(.504)
.(026)
Gov. expend.: mean
.947
.240
.753
.438
1.139
.523
(3.07)**
(.532)
(3.26)***
(.372)
(4.17)***
(1.09)
Gov. expend.: volatility
-.153
-.104
-.141
-.139
-.179
-.166
(1.79)
(1.36)
(1.97)*
(.644)
(2.14)*
(2.02)*
Inflation: mean
.007
-.028
.018
-.025
.023
-.047
(.839)
(1.60)
(2.23)**
(.553)
(2.47)*
(1.71)
Exch. rate fluct.: mean
-.054
.097
-.018
.075
-.001
.070
(3.42)**
(4.12)***
(1.02)
(2.07)*
(.045)
(2.69)**
Credit by banks: mean
-.085
.008
-.098
-.020
-.104
-.036
(1.83)
(.261)
(1.68)
(.192)
(1.76)
(.656)
Secondary education: mean
-1.80
1.06
-.660
.534
-1.859
.862
(2.16)*
(2.08)*
1.10)
(.322)
(3.32)***
(1.11)
Pop. size: mean
-.307
.576
.576
(.211)
(.137)
(.259)
Pop. growth rate: mean
-.395
-.084
-.050
(.942)
(.085)
(.129)
Fertility rate: mean
.918
.342
.339
(1.76)
(.292)
(.736)
Mortality rate: mean
-.114
-.247
-.124
(1.13)
(.841)
(.833)
Democracy: mean
3.04
-.362
(3.64)***
(.431)
Dem. – Autoc.: mean
.013
-.267
.069
-.070
(.114)
(2.57)**
(1.09)
(3.49)***
Exec. open.: mean
.152
.905
-.512
1.739
(.186)
(.767)
(.74)
(1.64)
Compet. partic.: mean
-.675
.944
2.266
-.457
(-1.21)
(1.56)
(2.29)**
(.569)
Test 2: indv1× inv_v2=01
1.47 (.107)
-1.59 (.075)
-1.22 (.145)
Test 2: indv1× inv_v2=0 (h)2
…
-1.67 (.057)
-1.25 (.117)
Test 3: indv1× inv_v2+indv2=0
1.74 (.078)
-1.23 (.128)
-1.96 (.061)
Test 3: indv1× inv_v2+indv2=0 (h)
…
-1.30 (.105)
-1.97 (.060)
Test 4: dem1× inv_v2+dem2=0
-2.58 (.031)
-.408 (.347)
1.92 (.063)
Test 4: dem1× inv_v2+dem2=0 (h)
…
-2.51 (.011)
5.87 (.000)
Obs.
36
36
36

Individualism, and
Democracy
Invest.
Volatility
-.151
(.218)
-.071
(1.43)*

Income
Growth
Volatility
.751
(.622)
-.142
(.949)

In-Group-Collectivism
and Democracy
Invest.
Volatility
-.542
(.664)
.961
(2.23)**

.465
(2.01)*
1.924
(4.72)***
.287
(.372)
-.187
(1.22)
1.053
(4.17)***
-.204
(3.05)***
.007
(.983)
-.036
(2.10)*
-.135
(3.47)***
-1.364
(3.20)***

.861
(3.32)***

-.722
(.622)
.049
(.244)
.234
(.413)
-.091
(.857)
-.029
(1.29)
.085
(3.48)***
-.014
(.250)
.459
(.574)
1.12
(.428)
.019
(.039)
.483
(.777)
-.158
(.850)
-.122
(.208)

-1.16 (.140)
-1.14 (.144)
-1.13 (.149)
-2.16 (.023)
1.86 (.05)
2.01 (.030)
36

2.575
(5.14)***
.243
(.316)
-.390
(-2.1)**
1.208
(4.33)***
-.260
(2.52)**
.004
(.522)
-.048
(2.30)**
-.141
(2.33)**
-1.621
(2.14)*

.704
(2.38)**

-.121
(4.74)***
.146
(2.09)*
-1.150
(1.42)
.184
(1.26)
-.152
(.464)
.003
(.040)
-.011
(.843)
.085
(5.80)***
-.004
(.116)
1.194
(3.30)***
-2.583
(2.08)**
.957
(2.09)**
-0.883
(1.97)*
-.034
(.255)
.651
(2.14)**

2.89 (.010)
…
1.55 (.098)
…
2.83 (.011)
…
36

Notes: 1. Model estimates and tests are generated from the country list common to Hofstede and Globe;
2. Tests are performed on estimated coefficients based on Hofestede’s country list: by construction, this is not valid for any model with
Globbe’s in-group-collectivism, denoted “…”. Regression results in this case are not presented, but available upon request.
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Income
Growth
Volatility
1.740
(1.95)*

Figure 1
Hofstede’s Individualism vs. GLOBE and Schwartz
corr = -.57 (p-val = .008)
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Individualism (1972), Investment and Income Growth Volatility (1973-2000)
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Investment and Income Growth Volatility Predicted Values (“*”)
Model 2 with Initial Control Variables
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